In short: Between 3 and 10 August 2026, three independent research teams published techniques for bypassing passkeys on Windows and Chrome. None of them break the underlying cryptography — FIDO2 and WebAuthn still hold up. Instead, the attacks exploit software implementation weaknesses: stealing already-issued authentication tokens or extracting a master secret from Chrome's process memory. All three require malware already running on the device. The practical takeaway: passkeys remain far safer than passwords against phishing, but offer no protection once a device is compromised.
What are passkeys, and why was everyone so confident?
A passkey is a cryptographic key pair generated on your device. The website stores only the public half; the private key never leaves your hardware and is protected by biometrics or a PIN. There is nothing to phish, nothing to guess, nothing to leak from a database breach. Major platforms — Google, Apple, Microsoft — have been aggressively pushing passkeys as the successor to passwords, and from 1 September 2026 Microsoft Entra ID will automatically enable them for enterprise accounts.
It is a sound direction. Phishing and credential stuffing — the most common attack paths — do not work against passkeys. Our security blog covers why even strong passwords fail when a service's database is breached; passkeys close exactly that door. But in early August 2026, three teams showed the cryptography held while the software around it did not.
Three attack techniques disclosed in August 2026
The disclosures arrived in quick succession between 3 and 10 August 2026. Researchers from SpecterOps, Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks), and independent researcher Dirk-jan Mollema each described a different path to bypassing passkey protection. All three are post-compromise techniques — they assume malware is already running on the victim's machine. That is an important caveat, but also an increasingly realistic one: according to Unit 42, phishing campaigns and trojanised installers place malware on millions of endpoints every month.
Pass-the-Passkey (SpecterOps): old YubiKey signatures stored in Windows Event Log
Presented at Black Hat USA on 5 August 2026, SpecterOps showed that Windows Event Logging stored old YubiKey cryptographic signatures in plaintext. Any authenticated user — including a remote one — could read those records. Combined with a validation flaw in Microsoft Entra ID (CVE-2026-34348, CVSS 6.5), an attacker could replay the stored signature and impersonate a privileged employee, bypassing phishing-resistant MFA policies entirely. Microsoft has issued a patch and confirmed additional mitigations against passkey relay assertions.
Golden Pass-ta-key (Unit 42): the 32-byte secret that cannot be revoked
This is the most serious of the three findings. Unit 42 researcher Arie Olshtein demonstrated that malware running without administrator privileges can extract a 32-byte Security Domain Secret from Chrome's process memory. That secret decrypts every passkey private key synced through Google Password Manager — with no fingerprint prompt, no PIN dialog, and no visible indicator on screen.
The critical issue: Google does not currently document a way to rotate this secret. Changing your Google account password is insufficient; the secret lives in Chrome's memory and synchronises across devices through your Google account. No CVE has been assigned and no patch is available. Google is aware and investigating. Alongside Golden Pass-ta-key, the team described two related variants — Pass-ta-key and Silver Pass-ta-key — targeting adjacent components of the Google Password Manager infrastructure.
Windows Hello Abuse (Dirk-jan Mollema): five-minute token forgery
Mollema showed that a low-privilege process in an already-compromised Windows session can use a Windows Hello for Business hardware-protected key without triggering a fresh PIN or biometric check. This lets an attacker generate valid FIDO2 credentials lasting five minutes — enough to acquire a Primary Refresh Token and gain prolonged access to the Microsoft identity ecosystem. No CVE has been assigned.
What this means for everyday users
Three conclusions stand out. Passkeys are still better than passwords. They block phishing and credential stuffing — the attacks that hit most everyday users. None of these findings change that. The real risk vector is device infection. Without malware on the device, none of the three attacks work at all. That makes endpoint hygiene — not avoiding passkeys — the top priority. No single tool covers every threat. LiMP VPN encrypts your traffic and hides your browsing from network observers including your ISP and public Wi-Fi operators. It does not scan your device for malware or patch software bugs — those are handled by updates and endpoint security. The layers work together, not instead of each other.
How to reduce your risk right now
Update Chrome and Windows. CVE-2026-34348 (the SpecterOps finding) is already patched by Microsoft — install the latest Windows security updates. Verify Chrome is current: menu → Help → About Google Chrome. For the Golden Pass-ta-key issue, no patch is yet available; keeping your Windows device free of malware is the most effective mitigation right now.
Audit active sessions. In your Google account go to Security → Your Devices and sign out any unfamiliar sessions. In your Microsoft account check Sign-in activity and revoke sessions you do not recognise.
Be careful what you install. All three attacks require malicious code already running on the device. The most reliable protection is not giving it a foothold — download software only from official sources and treat unexpected links in messages with scepticism.
Add a network privacy layer. LiMP VPN encrypts your connection with a strict no-logs policy, protecting your network activity regardless of which authentication method your accounts use — an independent layer that complements device-level defences.
Sources
- The Hacker News — New Passkey Attacks Can Recover Synced Private Keys or Bypass Phishing-Resistant MFA
- The Hacker News — Google Password Manager Attacks Could Let Malware Hijack Passkey-Protected Accounts
- Anti-Malware.ru — Researchers bypassed passkeys in Windows and Chrome without breaking cryptography
- CybersecurityNews — Pass-the-Passkey Attacks Expose Windows 11 and Microsoft Entra ID