In short: Security researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk disclosed on August 4, 2026 that three WebKit mechanisms can bypass iCloud Private Relay and expose a user's real IP address to any website that triggers them. No interaction is required — visiting a page is enough. Apple told 404 Media it is investigating, but has given no patch timeline; a fix is expected in fall 2026.
What is iCloud Private Relay and why it matters
iCloud Private Relay is a paid Apple feature available to iCloud+ and Apple One subscribers. It routes browser traffic through a two-hop relay: the first Apple server knows who you are but not your destination; the second server knows your destination but not who you are. In theory, neither hop has the full picture. Many iPhone and Mac users treat it as a convenient alternative to a VPN for everyday Safari browsing.
As our blog has documented repeatedly, relying on a single tool for privacy rarely holds. Private Relay is a case in point.
Three bypass methods discovered
The researchers at mysk.blog identified three WebKit features that operate outside the configured proxy path.
1. DNS prefetching. Browsers resolve the addresses of links on a page before you click them. WebKit performs these lookups through the device's standard system DNS stack rather than through the Private Relay proxy. An attacker controlling a DNS server can therefore see your real IP before any click happens.
2. WebAuthn Related Origin Requests (Passkeys). When a site requests passkey authentication tied to a related domain, the operating system's credential service — not Safari — fetches a validation file directly from the destination server, bypassing the proxy. The researchers explained: "Any website can configure WebAuthn in a way that causes WebKit to reveal the browser's real IP address" — with no user interaction required, simply loading the page is sufficient.
3. WebTransport. This newer API opens low-latency bidirectional connections over HTTP/3 (QUIC). WebKit builds the connection using its own network settings rather than the session's proxy configuration, delivering the device's real IP directly to the server.
The researchers published a test page at leaks.psylo.app where you can check whether your real address leaks with Private Relay enabled.
What this means for ordinary users
The core risk is de-anonymisation. Advertising platforms, trackers, and malicious actors can correlate your real IP with a browsing session even if you believe you are protected. This is especially significant when you connect from a workplace, home network, or public hotspot you want to keep private. The WebAuthn path is particularly subtle: there is no visible sign when a page silently collects your IP address during credential validation.
Desktop Chrome is not affected — it uses its own network stack, not WebKit. On mobile, every iOS browser is built on WebKit and is potentially vulnerable. Compare protection layers on the LiMP VPN features page.
How to protect yourself right now
Until Apple ships a patch, a few steps reduce exposure.
First, install the LiMP VPN app on your iPhone or Mac. A system-level VPN tunnels all device traffic — including DNS lookups and WebTransport connections — through an encrypted channel before WebKit can open a direct socket. This is an architectural difference: the tunnel intercepts traffic at the network layer, below WebKit. The no-logs policy means the service itself never records your visits.
Second, disable DNS prefetch in Safari: Settings → Safari → Advanced → turn off Preload Top Hit (the exact path may vary in iOS 26). Third, apply iOS and macOS updates immediately when they ship — the fix for this issue is expected in the next major release. Check the pricing page for the currently supported platform versions.